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Thisis a study of the welfare implications of changes in the
coinsurance rate of health insurance policies. Oniy efficiency
aspects are studied; distributional problems are ignored.
The basic function of health insurance is the reduction of uncer-
tainty; other things being equal, individuals prefer and are willing
to pay for a reduction in their financial risks. To that extent, a
reduction in the coinsurance rate would represent a welfare gain.
However, given that illness has occurred, insurance constitutes a
subsidy to one fonn of consumption and therefore implies an
efficiency loss whose magnitude depends on supply as well as
demand conditions.
To get a precise expression for the net welfare change associated
with a change in the coinsurance rate, it is necessary to formulate the
problem as a miniature general equilibrium model, with both
supply and demand considerations made explicit. Account must be
taken of the random factors in demand, the financing of health
insurance (here assumed to be by lump-sum taxation), the elasticity
Part of Rand Corporation study for the Office of Economic Opportunity (R-1281-OEO). The
author is indebted to Charles Phelps and John Stein for many helpful comments, especially
with regard to implicit assumptions and to exposition. All opinions are those of the author and
not necessarily of the Rand Corporation or the United States government.
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of supply, and the determination of medical prices through supply to a suc and demand. For each coinsurance rate, there is an equilibrium elastic price for medical services. Each individual, given his income net of could w the taxes needed to pay for health insurance, has a demand for I haw. medical services in each state of nature and therefore an expected econom utility, taking into account uncertainty about health and medical markets
costs. In the study I evaluate the change in expected utility as the betweet
coinsurance rate changes (see especially theorems 1 and 3). perfect
If the supply of medical services is totally inelastic, then a change The gen
in coinsurance rates has no efficiency effect whatsoever. The price elasticit
of medical services charged by the seller changes just enough so surprisii
that the coinsurance payment (the price to the buyer) remains welfare
constant; hence, there is no effect on demand or on financial risk. indeper
When supply is totally inelastic, changes in coinsurance rates affect to transf
only the distribution of income between suppliers of medical of the





In this paper I make the following assumptions:
1.The health status of an individual is a random variable whose
distribution is independent of prices and income;1 the indi-
vidual aims to maximize his expected utility. 2. EXPLIC
2.The utility depends on the amount of goods other than health
care, the amount of health care, and the state of health. Let
3.The insurance offered reimburses the expenditure on health =s
care by a fixed proportion. =
4.Given this coinsurance rate, the individual freely chooses the =
amountof medical care he wants after knowing his health x1 =
status. =
5.The health insurance payments are financed by lump-sum
taxes. p=1
I ignore distributional considerations and assume a single person =
inthe economy. The interaction between distribution and insur-
. =
anceneeds separate analysis.
Involved in this study is an investigation of the gain or loss of Prices, t
welfare associated with a small change in the coinsurance rate. For numeraii
this purpose, it is clearly necessary to consider both supply and individu
demand. The rapid increase in the prices of medical services since tions. II
the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid can possibly be inter- health
preted as the response of a market with relatively inelastic supply sure all c
Arrow 5
JChairough supply to a sudden increase of demand; if medical supply were highly
equilibrium elastic, the consequences for demand and therefore for efficiency
income net of could well have been very different.
a demandfor I have constructed a miniature general equilibrium model of the
e anexpected economy disaggregated only into medical and nonmedical service
and medical markets. On the supply side, the main issue is the transformation
1 utility as the between medical and nonmedical services. The hypothesis of
and 3). perfect elasticity of supply has been implicit in most previous work.
then a change The general case is treated here. The particular case in which the
ver. The price elasticity of supply is zero turns out to have a property that may be
ust enough surprisingat first glance, although it is not hard to see that it is true:
uyer) remains welfare, and indeed the allocation of resources as a whole, is totally
financial risk, independent of the coinsurance rate. All a change in the rate does is
ice rates affect to transfer purchasing power between the medical and other sectors
rs of medical of the economy.
The welfare gains and losses have been treated in a paper by
Feldstein (1973), although the theoretical basis of the calculation is
not set forth too exactly. He also considers the nonoptimal behavior




2.EXPLICIT FORMULATION OF THE MODEL
erthan health
f health. Let
ture on health s =stateof health
=demandfor goods other than health care by individual in state s
ly chooses the =demandfor medical care in state s
'ng his health =supplyof goods other than medical care
=suppiyof medical care
by lump-sum =utilityin health states ifx15,x25 is consumed in that state
p =priceof medical care received by seller
q =priceof medical care paid by buyer single person
1 . T=lump-sumtaxes needed to finance health Insurance on ann insur- y =incomeafter taxes
rain or loss of Prices, taxes, and income are measured, with "other goods" as
ance rate. For numeraire. To avoid distributional considerations, I assume that all
h supply and individuals have identical endowments and identical utility func-
services since tions. I further assume a very large population, with the state of
sibly be inter- health varying independently from individual to individual. Mea-
elastic supply sure all quantity variables on a per capita basis. Then the aggregate
5 Changes in Health Coinsurance Ratesdemand for commodity i is which is nonstochastic and is, in where
equilibrium, equal to the supply, The o
(1) =x,(i =1,2) x18(q, y)
x1,
I assume that the insurance policies specify function
pendent;
r =qip = coinsurancerate that for j
but that the actual values of p and q are determined by market E(x13 +
forces, to satisfy (1). The total cost of insurance (per capita) is then
(p —q)x2, or, but from
thatyisi
(2) T =(1 — r)px2 and x2 a
The representative individual derives his income by selling x1 supply
units of goods other than medical care (more exactly, the resources resource
that will produce x1 units of other goods) and x2 units of medical the coin
care, the former at a price equal to 1, the latter at price p. Hence, equilibri
would ii,
(3) y = x1+ px2— T=x1+ rpx2= x1+ qx2 coinsura:
I assume that the individual's supply' decisions are made on a The ci
purely economic basis; there are no net advantages or disadvan- represen
tages to the production of medical services. If supply is inelastic, x1 Sion; it a
and x2 are given, and p is determined by demand conditions. If medical
medical services are produced perfectly elastically at price that migi
x1 + px2 is given to the individual and to society, p is determined by be the in
technological considerations, and the actual values ofx1 and x2 are (7)w= E[
determined by demand conditions.
In the general imperfectly elastic supply case, the supply func- The e
tions x1(p) and x2(p) are determined so as to maximize x1 +px2
. pathcula
subject to a transformation constraint. Since p is the marginal rate of turn are
transformation, function
the spin
(4) + = o (1975,CI
dp dp
Once the state s has occurred, the individual maximizes
U(x18,s) subject to the constraint
(5) x1,+ = y
3. THE GE
(Strictlyspeaking, the budget constraint is a weak inequality, but in EFFECT
thiscase it is assumed to be. binding.) The optimality conditions















y at price p,
Letermined by





where A8 is the marginal utility of income in state s.
The optimization defines, for each s,thedemand functions
x13(q,y)and x28(q, y). For given r, q and y are in turn functions of p,
x1, andx2. The aggregate demands,E(x18) (i =1,2),are therefore also
functions of these variables. The two equations (1) are not inde-
pendent; if the equation for i =2is multiplied by q and added to
that for i =1,
E(x18 i-qx23) =x1 +qx2
but from (3) and (5), this reduces to the tautology, E(y) =y(recall
that y is not dependent on s).Hence,the equilibrium values of p, x1,
and x2 are defined by one of the equations (1) together with the
supply conditions. There is thus an equilibrium allocation of
resources between medical care and other goods for each value of
the coinsurance rate r, and I wish to evaluate these alternative
equilibria. Ideally, I would like to optimize on r; as a minimum, I
would like to determine whether an increase or a decrease in the
coinsurance rate would increase welfare.2
The criterion of welfare is taken to be the expected utility of the
representative individual. This respects his attitude to risk aver-
sion; it also has the implication of respecting his tradeoff between
medical care and other goods in any given state of health, a point
that might be more arguable but will not be challenged here. Let W
be the individual's welfare:
(7) W =E[U(x13,xe,, s)]
The equilibrium magnitudes of the system are functions of r. In
particular, for each s,x13and x23 are functions of q and y, which in
turn are determined, for fixed r, by p, x1, and x2. Hence, W is a
function of r. I shall examine the effects of marginal changes in W;
the spirit of this analysis is therefore very similar to Lesourne's
(1975, Ch. 3, Sec. I).
quality, but in
ity conditions
3. THE GENERAL FORMULA FOR WELFARE
EFFECTS: FIRST FORM
First,differentiate the budget equation (5) with respect to r.
dx1, —dy dq +q——
dr drdr dr
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But from (3), (see, for
dtjdx dx2 dq to —=----—+q----—
1 drdr dr dr ilonai rn
so that (11) w0=
dX1q dx2,dx1 dx2 dq
(8) + q = + q —— + (x2
dr drdr dr dr Because
Now differentiate the welfare criterion (7) with respect to r. perfect
available
dW (ÔU dx1, ÔU found fo
dr dr dr) e seco:
Since




r/dx1 dx2 dq =E IX,
L\dr dr dr (12)
Notice,however, that the magnitudes
drdr dr
Take
are independent of the state of health and hence are not random /
variables.They can therefore be factored out of any expectation. E
The marginal effect of coinsurance rate on welfare therefore takes dT
the form and ther
(9) = + q E(A,)—E[X,(x2.—X2)] dx2=
Thefirst term of (9) represents the welfare gain within each state
s resulting from an increase in the coinsurance rate, which is a Now, fro
decrease in the subsidy to the consumption of medical services. d
The second term is the distinctive element that measures the W0 =
welfareloss because of increased risk-bearing. With regard to the
second term, notice that from (1), x2 is the mean value of x28; =
hence,by the usual definition of a covariance, (13)
(10) E —x2)]=
=
thecovariance of medical services used with the marginal utility
of income. I shall return to this term in Section 5.
At the moment, I use standard methods of second-best analysis
8 Arrow(see, for example, the discussion in Lesourne, 1975, cited above)
to restate the first factor in the first term of(9). This is the conven-
tional measure of marginal welfare effect, and I give it the symbol
(11)
dr dr
Because of uncertainty and the fact that markets are therefore not
perfect (in the sense that the full set of contingent markets is not
to r. available),there are two somewhat different expressions that can be
found for W0, the first of which is more useful econometrically and
the second of which is more useful for theoretical analysis.




(12) = + +q + X2
ôqdrOy \dr dr dr
t9q Oy )dr t9Y\dr dr
Take expectations of both sides of(12). From (1),
e not random /
i dE dx2 expectation. E i I=
______
=





e, which is a Now, from (4) and (11),
lical services. dx1 dx2 dx2 dx2 W0—--—-+q——=—+p---—+(q--p)------- nieasures tne dr drdr dr dr
regard to the
value of x28; =(q
(13) dr
dri arginal utility L\ /
+(q—p)E -nest anaiysis ôt,




resembles a Slutsky compensated derivative but, in fact, is not,







If a demand curve for medical services is fitted to time series in
the usual way, the dependent variable is E (x23), and therefore all
the terms in the expression can be calculated from the econometric
analysis. The sec
Solve in (13) for W0, using the abbreviation (14), income
to assun
(q —p) tures in (15)W0 =
1 +(p—q)E dr variance
\
Oy) Therefo
that W0 When there is some insurance, q <p; since medical services are a the resi normal good, the denominator is certainly positive, and the sign of variable W0 is opposite to that (if dq/dr >0). shown I An alternative expression forwill strongly suggest that it must contrast be negative. Let S22,, be the compensated effect of a change in the with th price of medical services for a given state s—that is, the derivative questiot of x2,, with respect to q when the consumer remains on an indiffer-
ence curve for that state. Remark 1(
Ox22
S22,, = + X2,,-w
Then Remark 2I:
in (9) is
Ox2,, Ox23 Ox23 out mon +x2 = S222—(x22—x2)
Oq role in ti




S22 —E(x22 —x2) I thana
determii
Of course, for each s, <0, so the first term is negative. The The ana
second term is the covariance between medical services and that dqlc
the marginal propensity to consume them (remember that this is the
covariance across states of health for a given individual). This term (17) =

































Thesecond term is rather unexpected; it represents the effect of
income on the variance of health expenditure. It seems reasonable
to assume that a higher income permits higher medical expendi-
tures in more serious illnesses; hence, one would expect that the
variance of medical expenditures would increase with income.
Therefore, it is to be presumed a fortiori that S22 is negative and
that W0 >0when q >p.Phelps has taken the absolute values of
the residuals from a regression of physician visits on a number of
variables including income (see Newhouse and Phelps, 1973) and
shown that the correlation with income is slightly negative, in
contrast to this argument. However, the effect is small compared
with the first term in (16), so that the negativity of S22 is not in
question.
Remark 1Clearly, when q =p(no insurance at all), then W0 vanishes
completely.
Remark 2If dq/dr =0,then again W0 =0.Then by (11), the first term
in (9) is 0 and so is the second term, so that dW/dr =0.To bring this
out more clearly, notice that the specific definition of r played no
role in the analysis; any parameter of the insurance contract would
have yielded the same formulas. In particular, r might have been
replaced by q everywhere. That is, one could imagine an insurance
system in which the government chose the buyer's price, rather
than a coinsurance rate, and then let the forces of the market
determine seller's price and from that the needed lump-sum taxes.
The analysis would have proceeded along the same lines, except
that dq/dr would have been replaced by the number 1. If
(17)
dq dq





and (15) itself becomes In the fo
interpret
dq shiftinti (19) —
dr specific
From (9), (10), (11), (18), and (19), one can write Theorem 1. dq/dr, th
medical













The and S22., is the compensated effect of a change in the price of made (for
medical services within a given state. I shall argue in Section 5 that perfect el under plausible assumptions the covariance between marginal The im
utility of income and medical services is positive, more rea
It should be pointed out that the welfare effect in Theorem 1 physician
measured in utility terms and therefore in arbitrary units. Usually, cumstanc
welfare losses are measured in some convenient numeraire. In this Assume I
case,there is no completely obvious numeraire. Goods other than of p = medical services appear to be the obvious choice, but under
conditions of uncertainty this is not a well-defined commodity; one =
hasto distinguish among other goods in different states of health. dp
The simplest numeraire appears to be the composite good consist-
Differenth ing of one unit of "other goods" in every state of health. The
marginal utility of this composite is E(X,), and therefore the welfare =:
lossmeasured in other goods is obtained by dividing dW/dr by
E(Aj. with respe
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4. THE GENERAL FORMULA FOR WELFARE


















In the formulas in Theorem 1 I ignored the fact that r was to be
interpreted as the coinsurance rate; the formulas are valid for any
shift in the insurance scheme or indeed in any other parameter. The
specific effect of coinsurance rates is confined to the expression
dqldr, the effect of the coinsurance rate on the buyer's price of
medical services. The evaluation requires supply considerations.
In the case of perfectly elastic supply, the seller's price, p, is
given by the technology. Since q =rp,
(20)
dr
when supply is perfectly elastic. Then the expressions in Theorem
1 can be evaluated from demand considerations alone.
Theorem 2 When supply of medical services is perfectly elastic, pro-
duction of a unit of medical services requires giving up p units of




whereis defined in the statement of Theorem 1.
The welfare evaluations of medical insurance that have been
made (for example, Feldstein, 1973; Pauly, 1968) have assumed
perfect elasticity.
The imperfectly elastic case, at least in the short run, is much
more realistic. Even in the long run, the production of both
physicians and hospital services occurs under such special cir-
cumstances that perfect elasticity cannot be taken for granted.
Assume that the supplies of the two types of goods are functions





with respect to r to solve for dq/dr.











































dy dp dq +x2--—
dr dr dr
Any shift in supplies induced by a change in p must lie on the
transformation surface; by (4),
x+ =0
Hence,as before,
+ = (! —
From(21)
Oq ôy / dr L JJdr
or,with the notation defined in the statement of Theorem 1,
From the identity p =qir,
dp—1dq q
drr dr r2
Substitute in (22)andsolve for dq/dr.
(23)dq
dr
From(23) the following observations emerge:
1.since S22 <0, dqldr <p,
ifisinfinite (perfect elasticity), dq/dr =
3.if=0(perfect inelasticity), dq/dr 0;
4.as r approaches 0, dq/dr approaches p (this assumes that there
is satiation in demand and some elasticity of supply, so that
there is a finite equilibrium value of p).
Substituting (23) into Theorem 1, after some simplification,
yields Theorem 3.
Theorem3.Let x2(p) be the supply function of medical services. Then,
dW [(q — —
dr —r522where V and S22 are defined as in the statement of Theorem 1. The
evaluation of this expression depends on econometric estimation of
the demand and supply curves and on the evaluation of the
covariance term.
Lust lie onthe 5. BETWEEN MARGINAL UTILITY OF
INCOME AND MEDICAL SERVICES
Toshow that this covariance is positive, it suffices to indicate that
both are increasing functions of the state of health. This presup-
poses that the states of health are measured in order of increasing
severity of illness (poor health has a high index number). The
desired result is derived from the following assumptions:
A.1.For fixed levels of medical services and other goods, the
marginal rate of substitution of other goods for medical
dr services is an increasing function of the state of health.
eorem 1, A.2.For fixed levels of medical services and other goods, the
marginal utility of other goods does not decrease with the
state of health.
A.3.For a fixed state of health, the utility is jointly concave in
medical services and other goods and twice continuously
differentiable.
A.4.For a fixed state of health and a fixed level of medical
services, the marginal rate of substitution of other goods for
medical services increases with an increase in the amount
of other goods.
A.1 amounts to saying that the states of health are ordered in such
a way as to make it true;theassumption is not tautological because
it does assert that if the marginal rate of substitution increases from
one state to another for one pair of values of medical services and
other goods, it does so for all.
A.2 means that if an individual is initially given a fixed level of
that there other goods and of medical services for all states of health, he would
supply, so that prefer to switch, if at all, to having the level of other goods rise with
illness, if the switch can be made on an actuarially fair basis and if
simplification, the level of medical services in any state is not subject to change. As
Joseph Newhouse has pointed out to me, A.2 is not expected to hold
for all states of health (see also Arrow, 1974, p. 5). Certainly, some 'rvices. Then states of health sharply reduce the value of other goods to the
patient; he is too ill to enjoy the consumption and ex ante would
have preferred to have shifted consumption of other goods to states
15 Changes in Health Coinsurance RatesI
of better health. In many states of ill health, however, other goods
(such as domestic servants and other forms of service, or travel to Uz —
lessdemanding climates) may be valued very highly. The result \
U2 U1
contained in Theorem 4 remains valid if A.2 holds only on the Since U2 > 0ai
average or even if the marginal utility of other goods falls, but not
too rapidly, as the state of health deteriorates. >0
A.3 is a usual statement of risk aversion. It means that given any
two possible pairs and (xl,of other goods and medical Equivalenfi services, the individual would prefer their average to an even
chance of getting one or the other. >qU1,
A.4 is self-explanatory. From A 4
Ifirst derive expressions for the rates of change of medical
services and of the marginal utility of income with respect to state
of health and then show that, under the above assumptions, both U12 —qU11U
are positive.
Differentiate the optimality conditions (6) and the budget equa- From the last
tion (5) with respect to s, the state of health. inequality
dx,, /dx,\ U,,(qU2, — U22)














We can treat this system in the usual way as linear in the deriva- than no insuran
tives, dx,,/cjs, dx28lds, and —dX,/ds.From the second-order condi- when r1 (tha
tions for a constrained optimum, the determinant, D, of the above
system must be positive. Straightforward use of Cramer's rule =—
yields dr
24
dx2,—U2,—qU,, if dq/dr > 0.
— D It appears tha
basis except for
dA,—U,,(qU2,—U22)+ U2,(U,2 —qU,,) next section. It
(25)
— D complete insura
s q =0;hence, th
Since q =U2/U,,the numerator of (24) can be written determined by I
16 Arrow 17 Changesvever, othergoods
erviCe, ortravel to
highly. The result
holds only on the
goods falls, but not
eans thatgiven any
goods andmedical
verage to an even
change ofmedical
,ith respect to state
assumptions, both
rid the budget equa-
—
—
0 log(112/U1) 2 — 2
112 Os









From the last two relations, the numerator of (25) satisfies the
inequality
S
U13(qU21 —1122) + U23(U12—qU11)>U19(qU2—(122)+qU13(U,2—qU11)
=— —2U12q+U22)0
since Uu0 by A.2, and
U11q2 — +U220
by A.3.
linear in the deriva-
second-order condi-
iant, D, of theabove
se of Cramer'srule
e written
Theorem 4According to assumptions A.1—A.4, the marginal utility of
income is positively correlated with medical expenditures. The
covariance constitutes an offsetting risk adjustment to the marginal
welfare change with respect to an increase in coinsurance.
In particular, Theorem 4 establishes that some insurance is better
than no insurance. From Theorem 1 and from the fact that V =1




It appears that nothing further can be estimated on a theoretical
basis except for the special case of inelastic supply discussed in the
next section. It is not even excluded, so far as I can see, that
complete insurance be optimal, although it is unlikely. In that case,
q =0;hence, the budget constraint tells us that x13=y,andis
determined by the condition




Since medical care is always costly in terms of discomfort and time, have been
we can suppose that the demand will be satiable. The solution to insurance t
the last equation, when=y,will be denoted by 4.Whenq thenthere
it is easy to calculate that D =— U22.Hence (24) and (25) become
servicespa
IR toa redistri ds U22ds U22 ds
This cot
The consumption of free medical services is certainly increasing Theorem 3
with the state of health (measured to increase with increasing equations (
illness); indeed, since the state of health has so far appeared only does not et
ordinally, it is reasonable to identify x°28 with s, so that dx°22/ds =1. equilibriun




= = utilityis in ds
The on!) The relation between marginal utility of income and state of health =qir.Th when medical care is free depends on the cross-effects of state of rates fall. 1 health and of medical services on the marginal utility of other medical se goods. It can be shown (see Appendix 1) that the covariance in services do question equals the variance of free medical services multiplied by to the supp an average value of the derivative dA,/ds =UIR+ U12; in symbols, cost of mec
Uaweighted average of the values of U1., + U12 for varying
—
S. t—__
The risk-aversion term may not vanish even for zero coinsurance.
(Remember that this is a term in the marginal welfare effect; the Then, the risk-aversion welfare gain is of the first order in the coinsurance no insuran rate.) It is therefore conceivable that it outweighs the allocation
term. In general, the values of U1., and U12 should be small, so (1 —t)x,
perfect insurance should not be optimal.
The calculation of can be made only by assuming specific
forms for the utility function and the distribution of states of health. which de( A specific example is developed in Appendix 2. Correspon
no-inSurafl
(1— t)px
6.THE CASE OF PERFECTLY INELASTIC SUPPLY
Inwelfare economics we are accustomed to the argument that
when supply is totally inelastic, changes in prices have no welfare which rise
18 Arrow 19om fort and time,
The solution to






id state of health
















effects. The argument may need to be reexamined here because of
the presence of uncertainty in demand and the absence of contin-
gent markets; but the conclusion remains valid. It does not seem to
have been adequately emphasized in the literature on health
insurance that if the supply of medical care is perfectly inelastic,
then there is no welfare effect at all from a change in the
coinsurance rate. There is, however, a rise in the price of medical
services paid to the supplier; in a multiperson world this amounts
to a redistribution of income to the suppliers of medical services.
This conclusion follows immediately by setting x =0in
Theorem 3. Notice that if x1 and x2 are both given, either of the
equations (1) has only a single unknown, q; r, the coinsurance rate,
does not enter, and income, y, is determined by q, from (3). The
equilibrium buyer's price and income are the same for all values of
r; in particular, the demands for medical services and for other
goods in each state s is the same for all r, and therefore expected
utility is independent of r.
The oniy variable that does change with changing r is p, since
p =qir. Thatis, the price of medical services rises as coinsurance
rates fall. The pre-tax income of society is increasingly directed to
medical services. To the extent that taxes to pay for medical
services do not fall on medical income, there is a transfer of income
to the suppliers of medical services. To illustrate, suppose that the










which decreases from 1 toward 0 as r decreases from 1 to 0.
Correspondingly, the ratio of post-tax medical incomes to their
no-insurance level is
(1 — t)px2=1—t=x1 +qx2
qx2 r rx, + qx2
which rises from 1 as r decreases.
19
IChanges in Health Coinsurance RatesAPPENDIX 1
Byconstru
Covarianceof Marginal Utility of Income and Health Jw(x)th
a
Toshow ti
TheoremIf X isa random variable and f(X) is a function, then to show ti
=uwhere u is a weighted average off'(X). nonnegativ
Differen
Proof Letg(x) be the density of X, a and b the limits of the range of W'(x) =E




Inthe te Integrating by parts, by the co




H(b) =E(X), H(a) =0,G(b) =1,G(a) =0 APPENDIX
Hence,
b
=ff'(x)[E(X)G(x) — H(x)]dx Covariance(
Services for Let Distribution
W(X)=E(X)G(x) —H(x) I seek her
Then, covariance
nature of t
=in f'(x)W(x)dx vices for a
Assume This holds for any function f(X). In particular, let f(X) =X,so
thatf' =1. x,
=JW(x)dx That is, I a
medical so that constant
(If v)xIOZ =Jf'(x)w(x)dx - Feldstein,
a servicesf
where. scnbed by /b




Toshow thatu= isa weighted average off'(X), it suffices
function, then to show that w(x) is nonnegative, or, equivalently, that W(x) is
) nonnegative.
Differentiating,
of the range of W'(x) =E(X)g(x) —xg(x)=g(x)[E (X) —x]
Hence, W(x) is increasing for x <E (X) and decreasing for larger
values of x.It has a maximum at x =E(X) andminimums at
the extremes,x =a andx =b. ButW(a) =O,W(b) =E(X) —H(b)
=E(X)—E(X)=O,soW(x)>Oforallx,a<x<b.
In the text, X is interpreted as the state of health s (as measured
by the consumption of medical services, when free) and
f'(x)H(x)clx f(X) is interpreted as the marginal utility of income, X.,, with the
derivative = + U12.
f'(x)G (x)dx
APPENDIX 2
Covariance of Marginal Utility of Income and Medical
Services for a Specific Utility Function and
Distribution of States of Health
Iseek here to illustrate how expressions might be found for the
covariance term of Section 5 if assumptions are made about the
nature of the utility function and the distribution of medical ser-
vices for a given coinsurance rate.
et f(x) =x, Assume that
s) = — + s)
That is, I assume (1) that utility is additive in other goods and in
medical services, and (2) the utility function for other goods has
constant absolute risk aversion (this assumptionis made by
Feldstein, 1973). Assume further that the distribution of medical
services for a given income and a given coinsurance rate is de-
scnbed by a gamma distribution (see Friedman, 1971),
1'(b)
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where use is made of(2.1) with m =—cqand n1.
22 Arrow 23 ChThis calculation is designed to show merely that manageable
formulas are not impossible, even though at the cost of strong
assumptions. The parameters a and b of the distribution of medi-
cal services demanded are in principle observable. The absolute
risk aversion cannot be inferred from data on the demand for medical
services but is at least inferrable for observed behavior in the pres-
ence of uncertainty—for example, the choice of stock portfolios. The
assumption of constant absolute risk aversion is uncomfortable; it
implies, for example, that the demand for risky assets does not
increase with wealth. However, alternative assumptions, such as
constant relative risk aversion, do not lead to simple formulas,
though in any case they always lead to expressions that can be
evaluated numerically.
NOTES
1.This assumption may be false if higher income leads to better living conditions
or to preventive medicine, which decreases the probability of serious illnesses.
In the present context, the income effects are those arising from changes in the
coinsurance rate and could not reasonably loom large.
2.Of course, this is within the context of insurance schemes that are purely linear
in medical costs. Indeed, actual insurance plans, with their deductibles followed
by coinsurance, are nonlinear and need closer investigation.
REFERENCES
1.Arrow, K. J., "Optimal Insurance and Generalized Deductibles," Scandinavian
Actuarial Journal, 1974, pp. 1—42.
2.Feldstein, M., "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of
Political Economy, 81 (March—April 1973), pp. 251—280.
3.Friedman, B.S., "A Study of Uncertainty and Health Insurance," Ph.D.
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1971.
4.Lesourne, J., Cost-Benefit Analysis and Economic Theory (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1975).
5.Pauly, M., "The Economics of Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, 68
(June 1968), pp. 531—537.
23 Changes in Health Coinsurance RatesCOMMENTS
William A. Brock
University of Chicago
Kenneth J. Arrow has constructed a miniature general equilibrium model that
is, on the surface, especially tailored to answer welfare questions about
coinsurance rates. Actually, however, a completely different interpretation
can be given to the model that will yield additional insights.
Let f(s) be the density function of states of health. Instead of thinking of
(1) W =fu(x1.,x2.,s)f(s)ds
as the expected utility of the representative individual, think of it as a welfare
function for a society composed of heterogeneous individuals with no
uncertainty in which f(s) equals the "proportion" of individuals of types. W is a
"natural" welfare function in the sense that it gives equal weight to equal
numbers—thatis,itisan equal treatment property. (See Arrow and
Kurz [1970] for a discussion of welfare functions in growth theory in which the
utility of future generations is weighted by their numbers in the social welfare
function.) Given this interpretation, Arrow's work looks more like a standard
welfare analysis of distortions.II there is only one type s,it is a standard
distortions analysis and the results of Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) and
Kawamata (1972) can be applied to yield theorems on the welfare effects of
increased "coinsurance" rates for general n goods models. In most n goods
cases, welfare decreases as distortion increases if there is some substitutabil-
ity in production, and welfare remains the same if supply is perfectly inelastic.
The same can be said for the insurance interpretation of Arrow's model. If
there is only one state of health in the world, there is nothing to insure—thus
there is nothing to compensate the economy for the welfare loss resulting from
the wedge imposed between the selling price and the buying price of medical
services.
According to the principle of continuity, this result tells us that we need
substantial variations (1) in the utility functions s) and/or (2) in the
density f(s) before insurance has any chance of becoming worthwhile from a
welfare point of view. Observations (1) and (2) are brought out fairly clearly in
Arrow's Equation (9) and his Theorem 4.
Some diagrams will be useful. These diagrams depict the standard
classroom presentation of the welfare analysis of distortions. DAB is the
transformation frontier. For given 1 >r = buying price/selling price, a
distOrted equilibrium E is depicted in Figure 1. Distorted equilibrium is a
selling.pricep and a point E such that indifference curve DF is tangent to the
line with slope — lIq through E, the line through E with slope — 1/p is tangent to
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change when r changes and that welfare willfall when the wedge a
increases—i.e., when r decreases, the subsidy to the consumption of medical
care increases. It is obvious from Figure 2 that since E does not change when
r changes, welfare does not change in the perfectly inelastic supply case.
Given r, find distorted equilibrium in Figure 2. Merely find q so that ICC(1 ,q)
passes through the corner point E of AEB and set p so that r = q/p. Here
lCç(1,q) denotes the income consumption curve of the representative indi-
vidual as a function of prices (1,q).
Basically, what Arrow has done in his paper is to extend the analysis of
figures 1 and 2 to the case of heterogeneous individuals. That is, ICC(1,q) is
replaced by
(2)
where (2) is a vector integral function of q. It is just the vector sum of income
consumption curves across s—each ICC5 weighted by f(s). Arrow's analysis
in Section 6 points out that W in (1) does not change when r changes for the
case of perfectly inelastic supply. It is obvious that the equilibrium E does not
change from Figuie 2.It is not obvious at first glance, however, that W does
not change since the distribution of demand across individuals may change.
I.e.,it is not clear that there is only one q such that
(3)



































1.Arrow assumes only one coinsurance rater for all states of health. It is
natural to ask from the perspective gained by viewing Arrow's model as
a model of people of type sif there are incentives for insurance
companies to divide states into classes and offer different coinsurance
rates for each class and be able to make a profit net of enforcement
cost by so doing. Enforcement cost must be paid because a person
may try to convince companies that he exists in a state of health that
has a different coinsurance rate from the state that he is actually in.
Since there is some sort of tradeoff between risk and distortion in
Arrow's model, it is natural to perform such a subdivision of the set of
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even though, as Arrow correctly points out, q appears only in the left-hand
side of Equation (3). Something needs to be assumed to guarantee unique-
ness of the solution q to(3). A sufficient condition for uniqueness is
forq satisfying (3), plus an appropriate boundary condition (see Dierker [1972]).
At any rate, r has no impact on welfare because r does not affect the set of
equilibria defined by (3).
Itis worth pointing out that distorted equilibrium may not be unique for
nonlinear transformation frontiers even though utility is normal in both goods
and only one state exists. Normality is sufficient for uniquenessifthe
transformation frontier is linear. (See Foster and Sonnenschein [1970] and
Kawamata [1972] for a general discussion.) If equilibrium is not unique,
Arrow's differential analysis may break down.
A general uniqueness theorem may be formed by writing the equations that
define distorted equilibrium as
(4) G(q,r)=O
Then follow Brock's argument (1 973, p. 555). his argument is easily extended
to general n goods models with a vector of distortions rRk by assuming
Dierker's uniqueness condition (1972) for a fixed r0 and assuming
is non-singular on the set {q G(q,r) = o} for each r. Just use (5) to prove that
the numbei of equilibria is independent of r and use Dierker's condition for
r =r0to obtain unique equilibrium for all r.
Thus, it appears that Arrow's analysis may be extended to n goods models
with vectors of distortions. The concept of radial increase in distortion
introduced by Foster and Sonnenschein (1970) will probably be needed here.
I think that I have said enough about the mathematics of Arrow's exercise.
Let us now turn to the economics. The following points suggest natural lines
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Under what conditions can private enterprise solve this problem
without government intervention? Extending Arrow's model to include
such optimum partitioning of the set of states that I suggested above is
likely to be important for policy purposes.
Let me expand on this point. Divide states of health into S1, S2, where
S1 denotes those states in which the consumption of medical care is
very painful (involving radiation therapy, heart surgery, removal of sex
organs, etc.) and where S2 denotes those states in which consumption
of medical servicesisless painful (corrective eyeglasses, minor
dentistry, minor cosmetic surgery, treatment of baldness, nose jobs,
sex therapy at Masters and Johnson, etc.). Quite clearly, one would
want a higher coinsurance rate for S2 states.
It seems to me that a very interesting general theory could be built by
explicitly modeling the amount of overconsumption in a given class of
states as a function of the particular characteristics of the medical
services—a Lancaster-Becker type of approach.
In a world in which the law of large numbers applies,it seems
possible that private enterprise would solve the problem without
government intervention subject to solving the difficulties pointed out by
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973) and Wilson (1973). Obviously, incentives
will be set up to subdivide states of health in order to capture the
efficiency losses, but equilibrium may not exist if differentiation gener-
ates lumpy costs (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1973; Wilson, 1973). It may be
that some kind of equilibrium may exist if the 'cost" of subdividing sets
of states is explicitly modeled.
2.Is the optimal choice of r in Arrow's problem enforceable in the sense
that it will be sustained by a competitive insurance industry? Since it is
probably not enforceable inthis sense, willitbe enforceable at
reasonable administrative cost?
3.The model needs to be disaggregated into different classes of people if
itis to be part of a "project to study the financing of medical care
services for the poor and near-poor" (Arrow, 1973, p. iii).But this
should be a relatively routine extension of Arrow's basic theory.
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Professor Arrow's paper addresses the welfare implications of changes in question trot
health coinsurance rates in a rigorous and stimulating fashion.It formally rates affect
restates the ubiquitous moral hazard argument within a general equilibrium encompassi
setting in which the effects of changes in coinsurance rates on the demand for transaction c
and the supply of medical care are considered simultaneously. The paper also question una
systematically considers the effects of coinsurance rate changes on the ciency impli
presumed utility costs of risk-bearing under some restrictive assumptions To illustra
concerning the relation between preferences for goods and medical care expositional
services and various states of health. Both analyses, rigorous throughout, are directly, but r
developed with admirable clarity and simplicity. In the course of this investiga- the onset of
tion Arrow develops an intuitively plausible, though generally unrecognized, demand for
proposition. He shows thatif the supply of medical services is perfectly health are
inelastic, then changes in coinsurance rates—indeed, any changes in the magnitude of
terms under which market health insurance is provided—would have no medical care
effects on welfare. As he has already taught us in his analysis of employer or monotonicall
co-worker discrimination,' the existence of discrimination under perfectly pecuniary co
inelastic supplies of relevant factors may affect only the distribution of income that preventiv
among various groups in the economy without engendering any allocative but only as
effects.In this study Arrow has developed a similar proposition under reduce the
conditions of uncertainty by demonstrating that when the supply of relevant particular) wi
goods is perfectly inelastic, the expected utility of a representative individual That is to sa
is unaffected by an increase in the wedge between buyer's and seller's price care
of medical care brought about by a reduction in the health coinsurance rate. optimal
abasic reservation concerning the generality of the analysis of ing transactio
welfare effects associated with changes in health coinsurance rates as the shadow p
developed in this paper. My reservation stems from the implicit assumption self-insuranci
from which the welfare implications have been derived that there are no close change of in
substitutes or complements to market health insurance, or, put differently, that Figure 1 is
coverage of medical care expenditures via a market insurance contract is the
'only two stat
only means of shifting related financial risks. But surely various alternative health (b) with
means of "insurance" are available that may reduce vulnerability to illness, its his loss func
severity, or, in general, the burden of medical care expenditures associated
29 Chan
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iditures associated
with poor states of health. Icall these means "self-insurance" and "self-
protection."2Things like nonprescription drugs, health foods and diets, physi-
cal exercise, frequent (uninsured) medical check-ups or, in general, the effec-
tive practice of "preventive medicine" are illustrative. Indeed, there are even
more general methods of risk-shifting or self-insurance, such as dependence
on family members or friends to assume financial responsibilities and to
provide some health care services in poor states of health, or the choice of
specific occupations and residential locations in which specific health risks
are relatively low. The base of the argument I wish to develop in connection
with these alternative means ot'lealth insurance is that they, like insurance-
induced consumption of medical care services, draw scarce resources away
from the production of other goods and services. Preventive care may be quite
costly in terms of time and other resource expenditures, and raising large
families as a means of shifting financial risks seems an inferior method of
insurance. Since the availability of market health insurance does not eliminate
expenditure of resources on self-insurance and self-protection, the relevant
question from a welfare point of view is how changes in health coinsurance
rates affect the overall allocation of resources to the general 'health" sector
encompassing both market- and self-insured health services and the
transaction costs of insurance. In general, one may not be able to answer this
question unambiguously without referring to the relative efficiency or ineffi-
ciency implicit in the provision of each form of insurance at the margin.
To illustrate the argument more pointedly Ishall assume, merely for
expositional convenience, that medical care outlays do not enhance utility
directly, but rather are dictated as an objective medical requirement following
the onset of poor states of health. Put differently, given the state of health, the
demand for medical care services is perfectly inelastic.3 Poor states of
health are assumed to affect consumers' welfare mainly via their impact on the
magnitude of the ensuing financial liabilities. These entail both direct costs of
medical care and the opportunity costs of sick days, which are assumed to be
monotonically related to expenditures on medical care (for simplicity, non-
pecuniary costs are ignored),Ishall also make the symmetrical assumption
that preventive care and other means of self-insurance are not desired per se
but only as means of shifting health risks, and that their sole impact is to
reduce the extent of financialliabilities (medical care expenditures in
particular) without affecting the probabilities that such states would occur.4
•That is to say, more self-insurance merely reduces the outlays on medical
care services during poor states of health. Under these assumptions, an
optimal allocation of resources between market-insured medical care (includ-
ing traqsaction costs of insurance) and self-insurance services would equate
the shadow price of transferring income between any two states of health via
self-insurance and the corresponding market (health) insurance terms of ex-
change of income.
Figure 1 is an equilibrium for which a representative, individual is faced with
only two states of health: good health (g) with probability 1— p and poor
health (b) with probabilityp. Let us denote the person's income in stateg by'!e;
his loss function from poor health by L(c), L being conditional on self-
29 Changes in Health Coinsurance Ratesinsurance expenditure in the amount of c "dollars"; the magnitude of market
insurance purchased by s—the net income added to the insuree's income in FIGURE 1
state b via market insurance (the absolute amount of L(c) covered through
market insurance net of the premium paid); and the market health insurance 9
implicit terms of exchange between net income in states b and g (defined in




In equilibrium, the market insurance line is tangent to the transformation curve
of income between states g and b as determined by the productivity of
self-insurance (point A inFi.gure1).If there were no transaction costs
e
associated with the provision of health insurance and if, as in Arrow's system, I — C — Si!
the amount collected in premiums exactly matched the expected amount of
medical care expenditures covered by insurance, then the price of insurance
would be actuarially fair, IT = p1(1 — p); the optimal coinsurance rate would be
zero; and Equation (1) could be restated as —p L '(c) = 1, or by approximation
(2)
pdenotes the expected absolute value of the marginal reduction in
the financial costs of illness (its actual value for the representative individual)6
andis the marginal expenditure on self-insurance. Since in practice the
transactioncostsofmarket insurance may be nonnegligible,let
= (1 + X)pl(1 —p), where X denotes the net loading factor (the proportion
by which ir exceeds the fair price of insurance). Then the optimal coinsurance
rate would be greater than zero, and by similar analysis it can easily be shown
that in this case
(3)
pdenotes the expected reduction in health-related
losses and — represents the corresponding expected reduction in insurance w
the transaction costs of insurance.7 In a welfare-maximizing equilibrium and, hence,
position, the sum of these two terms must equal the marginal cost of larly, an exo
self-insurance. Notice that for the representative individual, a decrease in the implies an
demand for self-insurance services and an increase in the demand for insured expenditures
medical care services, for example, may involve a reduction in the price of poor health,
self-insurance services and an increase in the price of medical care services Note 8). As
if the relevant supply curves were upward sloping. Since a representative self-insuranc
individual may be assumed to be both a producer and a user of health care health coins
and health insurance services, his expected utility would be affected only by However, the
real exchanges between self-insurance services and market-insured medical amount ofr
care. L, C, and s, the basic variables of the model, therefore will be defined selfinsuranc
throughout the following analysis in real rather than nominal terms.
' If the initial
Clearly, market health insurance, s, and self-insurance services, c, are of changes
substitutes in the sense that a decrease in the (real) price of one induces a exogenous c
greater demand for the other.8 Moreover, any exogenous decrease in self- amount or
services and
30
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insurance would, by assumption, expand the potential losses from ill health
and, hence, would increase the demand for coinsured medical care. Simi-
larly, an exogenous decrease in health coinsurance rates, which necessarily
implies an increase in s, unambiguously would lead to reduced resource
'expenditures on self-insurance, an increase in the actual losses in states of
poor health, and an increase in the demand for medical care services (see
Note 8). As long as the supply of market-insured medical services and
self-insurance services are not perfectly inelastic, an exogenous change in
health coinsurance rates is thus expected to generate allocative effects.
However, the net effect on welfare depends on the overall change in the actual
amount of resources allocated to medical care, market insurance, and
self-insurance activities.
If the initial equilibrium position were optimal, then the welfare implications
of changes in health coinsurance rates would be readily evident: any
exogenous change in these rates would bring about an increase in the total
amount of resources allocated to market- and self-insured health care
services and a reduction in the market value of personal income (indicated by






the height of the market insurance lines in Figure 1). The expected utility of a
representative individual will fall. As Figure1illustrates, expected utility
would decrease following any change in the market and self-insurance nexus
away from points A and B, corresponding to the optimal valuesandThis
is seen, for example, by a shift from the injtial equilibrium to, say, points E and
C following an exogenous decrease in self-insurance expenditure and a
consequent decrease in the health coinsurance rate (and an increase in
market insurance purchased). But precisely the same reduction in expected
utility would be associated with an exogenous increase in self-insurance and
a resulting decrease in market insurance and the health coinsurance rate
relative to their optimal magnitudes (compare points D and C with A and
B).The important implication of this analysis is that in comparing situations in
which coinsurance rates are suboptimal, one cannot determine unambigu-
ously whether a reduction in the coinsurance rate would increase or lessen
the misallocation of resources. A reduction in health coinsurance rates could
be corrective if, for example, initially self-insurance were less efficient than
market insurance at the margin so that Equation (3) were an inequality such
that
(4)
In this case more market insurance and medical care and less self-insurance
services would be desirable.
Professor Arrow has focused attention on an important welfare issue
associated with health coinsurance rates—namely, the potential resource
misallocation arising from an increase in the wedge between buyers' and
sellers prices when the demand for health care services in each state of
health is elastic with respect to its price. It has been argued in this comment,
however, that in to adequately analyze the direction of welfare effects
resultings from (exogenous) changes in health coinsurance rates, one would
wish to consider jointly the production of market-insured health services and
alternative health insurance activities, including specific uninsured medical
services. Since Arrow's general formula describing welfare effects does not
account for resource shifts involving such alternatives to market-insured health
services, empirical estimates of welfare effects relying solely on this formula






































2.See Ehrlich and Becker (1972).
3.This assumption does not imply that the demand for insured medical care is unresponsive to
changes in the coinsurance rate or the underlying price of insurance. As the following analysis
demonstrates, a reduction in the coinsurance rate—an increase in the coverage ratio of
ill-health-related losses—generally would enhance the demand for insured medical care
because of a substitution away from self-insurance toward market insurance.
4.The analysis of the interaction between market health insurance and self-protection efforts
designed to reduce the likelihood of states of ill health is more complicated than the analysis of
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the interaction between market insurance and toss-reducing self-insurance, which is why the
first analysis is ignored here. However, the basic implications developed in the following
analysis concerning the welfare effects of changes in health coinsurance rates are general and
would hold equally well when one's own efforts were expected to reduce the probabilities of
poor states of health as well as the severity of illness and other related losses in such states.
5.The equilibrium condition is arrived at through maximization of the expected utility function
(la)E(tJ) =(l —c —Sir) +pU[l'—L(c) —c +s]
with respect to c and a. Alternatively, let the coverage ratio (1 minus the coinsurance rate) be
denoted by 8 and let the loading factor be defined in terms of the gross amount paid in claims.
X' —1). One then can proceed by maximizing the expected utility function
(Ib)EfJ) =(1 —p)U—c —kp8L(c)I —c —— 8(1 —kpIlL(C)l




1 +j1 —8)1 —kp)]L'(c) 1 —kp
Notice that since self-insurance is assumed to be effective, the term L'(c) + 1in Equation (1) is
less than or equal to zero. The function L(c) is also assumed to be continuously differentiable
and convex.
6.Following Arrow's analysis,I assume that health risks are independently distributed among a
large number of individuals, so that the expected change in resources devoted to market-
insured medical care would be the same as the actual resources devoted to accomodate the
representative individual.
7.Alternatively, using Equation (ic) in Note 5,the equilibrium condition can be restated
more simply in terms of the gross loading factor as follows
l3a)(1 + = Ac
8.Strictly speaking, this theorem holds unambiguously only insofar as the relation between and
not the coverage ratio 0, is concerned. However, an exogenous increase in 8, given L, implies an
increase in the quantity of insurance, since quantity of insurance is defined bys = OL (1 — kp).
Furthermore, it can easily be shown through appropriate differentiations of Equation (1 b) in Note 5
and utilization of the assumption that individuals are risk averse that an exogenous decrease in
the coinsurance rate r = 1 — 0 would necessarily reduce the optimal value of self-insurance
expenditures, c. Such a decrease in r would thus raiseL, hence the demand for (insured) medical
care services, and the quantity of insurance purchased, a
REFERENCES
1.Arrow, Kenneth J., "The Theory of Discrimination," in Orly Ashenfelter and Albert Rees (editors),
Discrimination in Labor Markets (Princeton: Princeton.tjniversity Press, 1973).
2.Ehrlich, Isaac, and Gary Becker, "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and Self-Protection,"
Journal of Political Economy, 80 (July—August 1972), pp. 623—648.
33 Changes in Health Coinsurance Rates
care is unresponsive to
the following analysis




'than the analysis ofG. NOR[
I
1.INTRODI
Inthis
demand f
decision-n
depends o
spans two
health are
because it
suppose ti
This paper rei
Preventive
Medical Goods
especially R.
have been adde
J. Heckman, for
shortcomings th
35